

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 04819 01 OF 02 031522Z

46

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-11 L-03 ACDA-19

NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00

SAJ-01 SS-20 NSC-07 AEC-11 SCI-06 MC-02 DRC-01 /138 W

----- 008552

R 031430Z SEP 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7371

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USCINCEUR

USNMR SHAPE

USLOSACLANT

CINCLANT

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 4819

E.O. 11652: GDS, 12-31-82

TAGS: PFOR, NATO

SUBJECT: NPG STUDY ON COMMUNICATING NATO'S INTENTIONS TO USE
NUCLEAR WEAPONS

REF: USNATO 4555

UK NPG STAFF GROUP REP SENT FOLLOWING LETTER, DATED AGUSUT 30,
1974 TO THE IS DIRECTOR OF NUCLEAR PLANNING, CONCERNING THE NPG
STUDY ON COMMUNICATING NATO'S INTENTIONS TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
LETTER PARALLELS UK REP'S COMMENTS TO MISSION OFFICER ON THIS
SUBJECT REPORTED REFTEL.

BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER:

1. I HAVE ALREADY SPOKEN TO YOUR STAFF AND EXPRESSED
LONDON'S VIEW THAT THE CURRENT DRAFT OF THE CNI STUDY - NPG
(STAFF GROUP) WP(74)7 (2ND REVISION) - NEEDS FURTHER WORK. I HAVE
ALSO SPOKEN TO SEVERAL COLLEAGUES - AS MAN AS I COULD DURING THE
PRESENT LEAVE SEASON - AND FOUND A MEASURE OF AGREEMENT WITH THIS
OPINION.

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 04819 01 OF 02 031522Z

2. LONGON'S CONCERN STEMS FROM THEIR CONVICTION THAT THE
QUESTION OF COMMUNICATING NATO'S INTENTION IS OF THE HIGHEST
IMPORTANCE, AND FUNDAMENTAL TO THE BASIC PURPOSE OF THE USE OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY NATO. THIS IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE CNI STUDY,

WHICH WILL FORM THE BASIS OF MUCH NPG WORK ON THIS ASPECT DURING THE NEXT FEW YEARS, SHOULD BE AS CLEAR AND COHERENT AS THE RECENT WP STUDY CHAIRED BY THE NETHERLANDS. IN OUR VIEW, THE PRESENT DRAFT DOES NOT MEET THIS REQUIREMENT. I SHOULD EMPHASISE THAT WE DO NOT DISSENT FROM THE THRUST OF THE STUDY - THE THOUGHT AND HARD WORK WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN PUT INTO IT BY THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF AND THE STAFF GROUP HAS ENSURED THAT IT IS WELL ON THE RIGHT LINES. THE PROBLEMS, AS WE SEE THEM, ARE OF ORGANISATION AND BALANCE.

3. WE FEEL THAT IN ITS PRESENT FORM THE STUDY IS TOO LONG, AND GIVES TOO MUCH SPACE TO PROCEDURAL DETAIL AND NOT ENOUGH TO A DISCUSSION OF SOME IMPORTANT ISSUES. IT IS ALSO REPETITIVE IN PLACES. IF THERE IS TO BE A USEFUL DISCUSSION AT THE ROME NPG, WE THINK THAT THE MAIN PAPER SHOULD CONFINE ITSELF TO A DISCUSSION OF THE PRINCIPAL ISSUES AND THAT THE PROCEDURAL DISCUSSION WHICH TAKES UP MOST OF PARAGRAPHS 22 TO 47 IN THE PRESENT DRAFT, SHOULD BE PUT INTO AN ANNEX. THIS WOULD ENABLE THE ARGUMENT IN THE MAIN BODY OF THE PAPER TO BE EXPANDED IN PLACES, AND TO BE SUPPORTED BY A BIT MORE IN THE WAY OF CLARIFYING REFERENCES TO THE BASIC TEXTS.

4. IN THE MAIN BODY OF THE PAPER, WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE A LITTLE RE-ORDERING. THE STATEMENT OF "PURPOSE AND SCOPE" AND "BACKGROUND", IS FINE AS IT STANDS. UNDER "POLICY FRAMEWORK" WE SHOULD LIKE TO SEE A PARAGRAPH WHICH DISCUSSES THE "STRATEGIC CONCEPT". WHAT THIS WOULD DO WOULD BE TO DRAW ON PARAGRAPH 17 OF MC14/3, AND THE SUMMARY THERE MADE OF THE THREE BASIC TYPES OF MILITARY RESPONSE WHICH ARE OPEN TO NATO. THE PURPOSE OF THIS WOULD BE TO REMIND MINISTERS OF THE PLACE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN NATO'S CURRENT STRATEGY, AND OF THE DIFFERENT WAYS IN WHICH THEY MIGHT BE USED AND THE DIFFERENT PURPOSES WHICH THEIR USE MIGHT SERVE. THE HOPE WOULD BE THAT THIS WOULD UNDERLINE THE IMPORTANCE OF A PROPER UNDERSTANDING BY THE ENEMY OF THE THINKING BEHIND NATO'S NUCLEAR USE, AND ALSO OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ENEMY NOT OVER-ESTIMATING WHAT NATO HAD DONE. THIS POINT
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 04819 01 OF 02 031522Z

MADE, THE DISCUSSION OF "CNI" FOLLOWS NATURALLY, AND ITS IMPORTANCE IS UNDERLINED. WE THINK THE "STRATEGIC CONCEPT" QUOTE FROM MC14/3 MIGHT STAND WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE EARLY DISCUSSION IN THAT DOCUMENT OF THE VARIOUS SCENARIOS. THIS WOULD SIT WELL WITH THE QUOTES OF PARAGRAPHS 38 TO 42 OF THE PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES.

5. WE ARE NOT VERY HAPPY ABOUT THE SECTION "GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON CURRENT NATO POLICY". IT SEEMS TO US THAT PARAGRAPH 7 MIGHT BE CONSIDERABLY REDUCED, AND BASICALLY SAY SIMPLY AND CRISPLY THAT FROM THE STARTING POINT ESTABLISHED BY THE MC 14/3, AND PPG QUOTES, THE PAPER WILL GO ON TO LOOK AT WHAT NATO WOULD WANT TO COMMUNICATE, WHEN, HOW AND TO WHOM.

6. SOMEWHERE IN THIS SECTION THERE IS A NEED FOR A CLARIFYING PASSAGE ABOUT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DIFFERENT KINDS OF CNI. THE PAPER AS IT STANDS DOES NOT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN A "MESSAGE OF WARNING AND/OR THREAT" - AND A "NOTE OF EXPLANATION". THEY ARE DIFFERENT, AND THEY WOULD BE DESIGNED TO SERVE A DIFFERENT PURPOSE. FOR EXAMPLE, A WARNING WOULD BE DESPATCHED IN SUFFICIENT TIME FOR THE ENEMY TO REACT TO IT AND FOR NATO TO DRAW BACK FROM ITS DECISION TO SUE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. A MESSAGE OF EXPLANATION WOULD NOT BE DESPATCHED IN SUFFICIENT TIME FOR THE WARSAW PACT TO NEUTRALISE NATO'S NUCLEAR STRIKE, BUT WOULD BE DESIGNED TO MAKE SURE THAT THEY DID NOT OVER-ESTIMATE THE EXTENT OF NATO'S NUCLEAR ACTION, NOR UNDER-ESTIMATE THE EXTENT OF NATO'S RESOLVE AND HERE WILLINGNESS TO ESCALATE FURTHER IF NECESSARY.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 04819 02 OF 02 031546Z

46

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-11 L-03 ACDA-19

NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00

SAJ-01 SS-20 NSC-07 AEC-11 SCI-06 MC-02 DRC-01 /138 W

----- 008810

R 031430Z SEP 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7372

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USCINCEUR

USNMR SHAPE

USLOSACLANT

CINCLANT

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 4819

7. HAVING DONE THIS, AND THROUGHOUT THIS PART OF THE PAPER, IT IS CLEAR THAT WE ARE DISCUSSING CNI TO THE ENEMY RATHER THAN TO ANY OTHER AUDIENCE-THEN THE DISCUSSION OF WHAT THE DPC WOULD NEED TO BE CONSIDERING BEFORE DECIDING ON A CNI- ESSENTIALLY THE PRESENT PARAGRAPHS 9-17- WOULD FIT NICELY. IN PLACES THEY MIGHT BE COMPRESSED A LITTLE-THE SECOND HALF OF PARAGRAPH 9 FOR EXAMPLE- AND IN PLACES WE SHOULD LIKE TO SEE THE DISCUSSION EXPANDED. PARAGRAPH 16 SEEMS TO US TO CONTAIN THE SEEDS OF A FRUITFUL DISCUSSION, AND MIGHT BE EXPANDED TO GIVE MINISTERS A BETTER BASIS FOR SUCH A DISCUSSION.

8. WE THINK THAT THE DISCUSSION IN PARA 17 ET SEQ OF A CNI TO PUBLICS AND THIRD PARTIES, SHOULD BE IDENTIFIED AS A SEPARATE SECTION RAISING RATHER DIFFERENT ISSUES. IN THAT SECTION MIGHT FIT MOST OF PARA 25, FOR EXPAMPLE, BUT MUCH OF

WHAT IS IN THE PARAGRAPHS EITHER SIDE OF PARA 25 WE WOULD PREFER TO SEE IN THE ANNEX.

9. YOU WILL SEE FROM THIS THAT WHAT WE ARE SUGGESTING IS THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO BRING OUT THE THINKING THAT IS BEHIND MUCH OF THE ARGUMENT OF THE PAPER IN ITS PRESENT SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 04819 02 OF 02 031546Z

FORM IN SUCH A WAY AS TO COMPEL MINISTERIAL INTEREST AND PROVOKE DISCUSSION. IT SEEMS TO US THAT ONCE THHE MAJOR ISSUES HAVE THUS BEEN EXPOSED, THEN THE PROCEDURAL ASPECTS FOR THE MOST PART WILL FLOW MORE EASILY THERE FROM.

10. IT WILL BE SEEN FROM THE FOREGOING THAT WE HAVE NOT SO FAR PROPOSED THE INJECTION OF NEW IDEAS INTO THE STUDY, RATHER WE ARE SUGGESTING A REORGANISATION OF THE CONSIDERABLE BODY OF USEFUL MATERIAL THAT IT ALREADY CONTAINS. HOWEVER, WE WOULD LIKE TO BRING FORWARD ONE IDEA FOR THE STAFF GROUPS CONSIDERATION; ONE THAT WE THINK MINISTERS MIGHT FRUITFULLY DISCUSS. IF IT IS IMPORTANT THAT CNI MESSAGES ARE RECEIVED BY THE WARSAW PACT, THEN IT IS IMPORTANT THAT CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION ARE NOT SUBJECT OT DISRUPTION(A POINT ALREADY RECOGNISED IN THE STUDY). IT MIGHT BE THAT NATO WOULD WISH TO DISCUSS WITH THE OTHER SIDE ARRANGEMENTS FOR MAKING ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN THAT IN TIMES OF CRISIS THE APPROPRAITE CHANNELS ARE KEPT OPEN.

11. ONE FINAL POINT; WE WOULD PREFER THE TITLE OF THE STUDY TO READ " COMMUNICATING NATOS INTENTIONS CONCERNING THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS" WHICH WE THINK WOULD MORE ACCURATELY REFLECT ITS SUBJECT MATTER.

12. WE INTEDND TO CURCULATE IN A FEW DAYS MORE DETAILED COMMENTS, WITH SUGGESTED REDRAFTS, WHICH MIGHT BE HELPFUL TO THE STAFF GROUP IN ITS NEXT CONSIDERATION OF CNI ON MONDAY 9 SEPTMEBER.

13. I AM COPYING THIS LETTER TO OUR COLLEAGUES ON THE STAFF GROUP. END TEXT OF LETTER. MCAULIFFE

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 11 JUN 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 03 SEP 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: garlanwa
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974ATO04819
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS, 12-31-82
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740988/abbrywzb.tel
Line Count: 205
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: USNATO 4555
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: garlanwa
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 10 APR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <10 APR 2002 by elyme>; APPROVED <04-Oct-2002 by garlanwa>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: NPG STUDY ON COMMUNICATING NATO'S INTENTIONS TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS
TAGS: PFOR, NATO
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO USCINCEUR
USNMR SHAPE
USLOSACLANT
CINCLANT
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

